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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALKER REALTY and 
CALVIN FLORENCE, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
vs 
JOHN E. RUNYAN, ESQ. 
AIRFREIGHTING., 
E. DEAN SHELLEDY 
MT. OLYMPUS ASSOCIATES, 
SHELTER, INC. and 
BETTILYON REALTY, INC. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 14121 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff), Calvin Florence, and the 
defendant-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the defendant), John E. Runyan, entered 
into an oral finders agreement, later confirmed by memoranda. The plaintiff was to find 
and introduce a ready, willing and able buyer to the defendant in return for a finders fee of 
$50,000 and delivery of apartment 3507 of the Banyan Tree Plaza with a $25,000 mortgage. 
The plaintiff performed and the defendant refused to perform and to meet his obligations. 
The plaintiff brings this action to obtain specific performance, damages and such relief as 
the court deems just and equitable. 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROl NI) 
Defendant's motion tor summary judgment was granted by OK low ex court c- the *>!v.d 
day of April, 1975. However, following : ; ,:.!.= - -^  •- - .mu i;-\u-t the 
attorneys for both parties, entered on the grounds that plaintiffs original ationu % >( I 
had been ill ii i, the hospital AUI\ dinchai; unable to attend to the niattei, the lower court's 
order granting summary judgment was vacated. Plaint , took over 
the rase am! „i hearing was held May 9th 1975. * i: *la- '* * defendant's motion for 
summary judgment as to ( if! ^ aexond amended complaint was 
granted. The lower court also granted summary judgment as to Connis III and i\' by 
stipulation o\ lOuttsel On the 22nd da> ui Ma> 1^'- me plaintiffs filed lheir notice of" 
appeal. 
K i l l H F SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek to have the lower court's order granting the ileteiuianf moiion for 
si iriniiai \ jiidgiiient reversed and to have the matter returned to the lowei coin l tor trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACIS 
"I he plaint it I, C 'ah m Florence, entered into an oral finders agreement with the defendant, 
John E. Runyan. I he oral agreement was e\uiuuv^ memoranda dated March 
18th 1974 and October 18th 1974. The plaintiff was to find una ntroduce to the dek-ndam a 
ready, willing and able bii\ei loi the delendanfs property in return for which introduction 
a finders fee was to be paid by the defendant. Hie plainittl" perfoimnl his obligation as 
agreed by finding and introducing a ready, willing, and able buyei, I he defendant refused 
to perform and pay the plaimill loi "services tendered.M 
I'OINI I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN TH \ F 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT IN CONTROVERSY EXIST IN THE RECORD. 
Plaintiff eonieinis ihai the oial tinders agreement entered into with the defendant is set 
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forth in the letter of John E. Runyan written October 18th 1974, attached to the Affidavit 
of plaintiff Calvin Florence dated January 6th 1975. 
"This will confirm that I will pay Cal Florence $25,000 for services rendered 
in conjunction with this sale and deliver to him apartment 3707 in the Banyan 
Tree Plaza in Honolulu, subject to the present outstanding mortgage 
indebtedness of approximately $25,500.00." 
This final written expression of the oral finders agreement, with its fee reduced by mutual 
agreement, expresses the terms of the oral agreement, the plaintiff's "services" having 
already been ' ' rendered.'' 
On the other hand the defendant, in his affidavit, relies upon the language of the March 
18th 1974 memorandum, also attached to the affadavit of the plaintiff Calvin Florence, 
which expresses that the finders fee "is contingent upon the ultimate completion and 
delivery of the building as per the stock sales agreement . . . which if for any reason fails to 
materialize, no portion of the finders fee will be paid." Hence a material issue of fact in 
controversy exists in the record and the plaintiff strenuously contends that the lower court 
erred in granting summary judgment in light of the existence of such controversy. 
POINT II 
THE AGREEMENT IN CONTROVERSY WAS A FINDERS AGREEMENT NOT A 
BROKERAGE CONTRACT AND THEREFORE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE 
PURVIEW OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Although the defendant, in his memorandum in support of motion for summary 
judgment, argued that the agreement in controversy was a brokerage contract and was 
therefore unenforceable under the statute of frauds, it is clear from the Record (see letter of 
John E. Runyan to Calvin Florence March 18th 1974 and Affidavit of John E. Runyan P. 
11 March 27th 1975) that the agreement was a finders fee agreement and therefore not 
within the purview of the statute of frauds. 
The distinction between broker and finder is clearly drawn in the case of Palmer v. 
Whaler, 285 P.2d 8 (Cal 1955), where finders are defined as those who make introductions 
between buyer and seller, while brokers or dealers are those who engage in actual 
negotiations and are agents who perform substantive acts for the seller. The court in Palmer 
held that " finders agreements and finders fees do not fall within the purview of the Statute Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of Frauds" (ibid at 12). (See also Freeman v. Jergins, 271 P.2d 210 (Cal 1954) for a recent 
case of Tyrone v. Kelley, 507 P.2d 65, at 69, 70 (Cal 1973) for lengthy list of cases on this 
point.) 
Thus the plaintiff strenuously contends that if summary judgment was granted by the trial 
court in a belief that the agreement in controversy was a brokerage agreement which fell 
within the purview of the Statute of Frauds, said court was in error. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF IT APPLIED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS MAY NOT BE INVOKED TO 
PERPETRATE A FRAUD OR GROSS INEQUITY. 
The plaintiff fully performed his duties toward the defendant under the finders agreement 
by introducing the defendant to a buyer ready willing and able to buy, (with whom 
defendant later entered into business transaction). In the language of the court in Welchman 
v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25 (1959) ". . . full performance would eliminate any application of 
the Statute of Frauds, becauses (sic) it may not be invoked to perpetrate a fraud or gross 
inequity" (at 28). (See also Ravanno v. Price, 123 Utah 559 (1953) and Chadwick v. Arnold, 
34 Utah 48 (1909). The very nature of a "finders" function exposes the finder to the very 
real danger of being denied his just fee by buyers and sellers who may agree to circumvent 
their having to pay the "finder" his fee by lease or deferred payment arrangements. Policy 
demands that such buyers and sellers should not be permitted to take refuge behind the 
Statute of Frauds to further bolster their breach of the finders agreement and deny 
"finders," like the plaintiff, their just remuneration when they provide ready, willing and 
able buyers (see Winkelman v. Allen 519 P.2d 1377 (Kansas 1974)). 
Thus, even if the Statute of Frauds were to apply to the agreement in controversy, which 
the plaintiff denies, the lower court was in error if it granted summary judgment on that 
basis because plaintiff has fully performed and thereby satisfied the proviso enunciated by 
Welchman, supra. 
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POINT IV 
SUFFICIENT MEMORANDA EXIST IN THE RECORD TO TAKE THE TRANSAC-
TION OUTSIDE OF THE PURVIEW OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS EVEN IF THE 
AGREEMENT IN CONTROVERSY WERE TO BE REGARDED AS A BROKERAGE 
AGREEMENT RATHER THAN A FINDERS AGREEMENT. 
The record contains sufficient memoranda to the agreement in controversy to wit; letter 
of John E. Runyan to Dean Shelledy, October 18th 1974, Affidavit of Calvin Florence 
January 6th 1975 and Affidavit of John E. Runyan March 27th 1975—to meet the 
requirements defined by the court in Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 222, 223, (1956) as 
necessary to take the agreement beyond the purview of the Statute of Frauds § 25 - 5 - 4(2). 
U. C. A. 1953. 
Indeed almost any kind of writing is sufficient if it is signed by the defendant and 
contains the essential terms of the agreement (see Fritsch v. Hess, 49 Utah 75 (1916)). Thus, 
both from the material facts found in the record and under the statute inself, the defendant 
cannot invoke the Statute of Frauds to defeat the plaintiff's claim and the lower court again 
erred in granting summary judgment on this ground. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, ALTHOUGH NOT ARTFULLY 
DRAFTED BY PLAINTIFFS ORIGINAL ATTORNEY, STATES A VALID CAUSE OF 
ACTION SUPPORTED BY PLAINTIFFS AFFIDAVIT THUS SATISFYING THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 56 (e) U.R.C.P. AND PRECLUDING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
The plaintiff's second amended complaint drafted by plaintiffs original attorney states a 
valid cause of action in that all the necessary details of the events surrounding the 
formulation of the finders agreement, supported by affidavit, are fully stated together with 
the plaintiff's allegations concerning his full-performance, allegations of the defendants 
nonperformance, and prayer for relief. 
It is the substance, not the form or artfulness that governs the sufficiency of such a claim 
under our notice pleading system, (see Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 492 P.2d 1137 (Cal 
1972), Stewart v. Arrington Construction Company, 446 P.2d 895 (Ida 1968)). Utah has 
traditionally exhibited great liberality in construing assailed pleadings eg. Harman v. 
Yeager, 100 Utah 30, 110 P.2d 357 (Utah 1941). 
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Indeed, a petition containing necessary allegations to advise the defendant of the claim 
against him and of the relief sought is deemed sufficient, although stated in an awkward 
and unskilled manner. Cooley v. Shepherd, 225 P.2d 75 (Kansas 1950). Further, the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment was tantamount to a motion to dismiss and 
could have been sustained only if the allegations of the petition clearly demonstrated that 
the plaintiff did not have a claim for relief, Woolums v. Simousen, 522 P.2d 1321 (Kansas 
1974). Continental Insurance Company v. Windle, 520 P.2d 1235 (Kansas 1974). As Utah 
case law indicates a decision to grant summary judgment should only be granted when 
under the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt 
resolved in the plaintiff's favor, the plaintiff could not recover as a matter of law. (see 
Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 28 (Utah 1959). 
Thus the plaintiff's second amended complaint is sufficient and for the lower court to 
grant defendant's motion for summary judgment was error. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The plaintiff strenuously contends that on the basis of the material facts in controversy in 
the record and from the legal points argued supra, that the lower court erred in granting the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment and that this court should reverse the lower 
court's order and return this matter to the lower court for trial. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant' 
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